Why Do We Need Non-state Actors in Public Diplomacy?:
Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy

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As a consequence of changing domestic and international socio-political environment, public diplomacy policies require relational, networked and collaborative approaches for more effective and long-term outcomes. This article explores the relevance of non-state actors to public diplomacy and suggests why and how collaboration takes place between state and non-state actors. Furthermore, the article develops a typology of collaboration between state and non-state actors for public diplomacy initiatives based on two dimensions: whose objectives are prioritized in the collaboration and who proposes collaboration. The article suggests that non-state actors' potential for public diplomacy can be tapped by state when state approaches non-state actors for collaboration as well as opening its channels for collaboration opportunities coming from non-state actors.

Keywords: public diplomacy, non-state actors, public relations, social networks, collaboration

1. INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy is widely used as a term both by practitioners and academics without an agreed-upon understanding of its definition and boundaries. Since its first use, public diplomacy was defined from different aspects of the term; that are its objectives or its strategies and tactics, or its actors (Zatepilina, 2010: 23). There are roughly two groups of definitions of public diplomacy. The first group of definitions differentiates public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy by acknowledging that foreign publics matter. Public diplomacy in these definitions is seen as official, state-centered government-to-publics interaction that is linked to a state's foreign policy outcomes (McPhail, 2011: 89). A representative example of the first group of rather earlier definitions is Malone's (1985: 199) as he regards the core idea of public diplomacy as "one of direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments."

The second group of definitions recognizes new actors, more variety of objectives, activities and strategies for what is called "new public diplomacy" (Melissen, 2005b). A representative definition of new public diplomacy is Gregory's (2011: 353) definition which is more comprehensive and more appreciative of both new actors and new objectives as he regards public diplomacy as "an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values."

Public diplomacy is a term that had currency for more than fifty years now and has witnessed an evolution in that period. Initially, 'public diplomacy' was coined as a new diplomacy tools different than traditional diplomacy as it addresses 'publics.' Later on it evolved into 'new public diplomacy' as a consequence of changing domestic and international socio-political environment due to factors such as globalization, consolidation

of democracies and technological advancements (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 435). The recent trend in the literature shows evolution of 'new public diplomacy' into "relational, networked and collaborative" public diplomacy (Zaharna, Arsenault, & Fisher, 2013). The lack of theoretical frameworks to study public diplomacy led scholars to apply other disciplines' theories to public diplomacy or create new frameworks using multidisciplinary theories. "Relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy" is an outcome of this necessity.

One of the contested areas of public diplomacy literature is how to treat non-state actors in the realm of public diplomacy. Reinalda (2001: 13-15) categorizes non-state actors as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). One common denominator of these three broad categories is that they are not representatives of states. In the literature, non-state actors are conceptualized as those that are relevant to international relations and operate at the international level (including transnational) (Arts, 2003, p. 5; Arts, Noortmann, & Reinalda, 2001; Reinalda, 2001: 13). In the case of analyzing non-state actors' role in public diplomacy, this definition can be relaxed to include individuals, formal and informal nongovernmental entities (e.g. university bodies, informal communities) that operate at the international level and relevant to public diplomacy (not necessarily to international relations). However, particular focus of this study will be on NGOs that operate on an international level and create public diplomacy outcomes either intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore the discussions below are most relevant to NGOs, but can be modified and applied to other non-state actors, too.

The more recent, new public diplomacy literature acknowledges the non-state actors' role in public diplomacy while collaborative approaches to public diplomacy ask for incorporating non-state actors to the public diplomacy equation. Nevertheless, there are only a handful of studies on non-state actors' activities in public diplomacy.[1] That is why Gilboa (2008: 57) calls for more research on "public diplomacy activities … of new international actors such as NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals."

The main purpose of this article is to explore the relevance of non-state actors to public diplomacy and to suggest why and how collaboration (can) take place between state and non-state actors in the realm of public diplomacy. This article theoretically incorporates non-state actors into relational, networked and collaborative public diplomacy while empirical research is beyond the scope of this study. The article will first explain the evolution of the term public diplomacy from state-centric definition to encompass more actors and strategies in a network environment. Secondly, the *Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy Framework* that analyze the necessity of collaboration between state and non-state actors for public diplomacy initiatives in such a network environment that requires careful relational approach in the long-run will be developed. It will explore *why* (Table 1) state and non-state actors collaborate (or should collaborate) for public diplomacy initiatives based on the recent public diplomacy literature and other related academic fields. Following the framework, a typology of collaboration between state and non-state actors will be developed and a normative approach to collaboration will be suggested for more effective public diplomacy. This part analyzes *how* (Table 2) state and non-state actors collaborate (or should collaborate) for public diplomacy initiatives.

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[1] For some rare examples, see (Attias, 2012; Cowan & Arsenault, 2008; Hocking, 2004; Huijgh, 2012; Mueller, 2009; Pigman & Deos, 2008; Snow & Taylor, 2009; Trent, 2012; Zatepilina, 2009, 2010).

2. INCORPORATING NON-STATE ACTORS INTO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Traditionally diplomacy is defined as "the process by which governments, acting through official agents, communicate with one another" (Plischke, 1979: 32). In a more contemporary interpretation, diplomacy is defined – most probably to encompass newly coined public diplomacy – as "the established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence" (Marks, 1980).

The idea behind coining public diplomacy term was to differentiate it from traditional diplomacy which takes place between state agencies. Even though the subject that practices public diplomacy was assumed to be the state agencies, the word 'public' was used to clarify that the publics – as opposed to foreign diplomats- were to be addressed in this new type of diplomacy agenda. Indeed, one of the earlier definitions in a U.S. government report shows this clearly: "[t]he U.S. Government has sought over the past 30 years to supplement and reinforce traditional intergovernmental diplomacy by playing a key role in what has come to be called 'public diplomacy' – international communication, cultural and educational activities in which 'the public' is involved" (Comptroller General, 1979: 1).

In a world where public attitudes and public opinion matter, states could no more overlook the importance of publics in order to directly or indirectly influence foreign policy decisions of other countries. In other words, the term public diplomacy was initially seen as a sub-concept of diplomacy to reinforce traditional diplomacy. Later on, non-state actors such as NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and corporations also entered the public diplomacy stage, changing the nature of diplomacy even more.

McDowell (2008: 8) argues that for public diplomacy "to be diplomacy, it has to entail a role for the state … working with civil society partners, funding, coordinating, and/or directing" while accepting that 'public' refers to the people rather than the state since public diplomacy "takes place in public". He (2008: 10) acknowledges that similar activities take place without government direction, but insists that conceptually they cannot be called public diplomacy without overall government direction for particular goals.

La Porte (2012) asks the question whether public diplomacy should be defined by the subject who practices it or by the object of the action. LaPorte (2012: 449) proposes that although traditionally defined by the subject, new public diplomacy should be defined by the object of action, legitimacy (confidence and support from citizenry) and effectiveness (effective satisfaction of citizenry). In order to differentiate public diplomacy from other forms of international communication, she suggests that the actor of public diplomacy should be minimally institutionalized and its objectives are political.

Castells (2008: 91) contends that "public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in international arena of the values of the public;" and by "*the public*," (emphasis in original) he means "what is common to a given social organization that transcends the private." He argues that since there is no need for a new term to call traditional practices of diplomacy, public diplomacy is not government diplomacy. Castells (2008: 91) evaluates 'public' as the subject of public diplomacy; but his definition of 'public' encompasses non-state actors that represent interests of people in the public sphere. Public diplomacy for him (2008: 91) "seeks to build a public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard in spite of their various origins, distinct values, and often contradictory interests." This kind of public sphere would act as "communication space in which a new, common language

could emerge as a precondition for diplomacy" (Castells, 2008: 91).

All of the three authors above (McDowell, La Porte and Castells) accept non-state actors as the new actors in public diplomacy. McDowell sees them as merely outsources of public diplomacy which is directed by governments. La Porte argues that minimally institution-alized non-state actors can do public diplomacy in their own right if they are pursing certain political goals regardless of government direction. While these two authors accept that 'public' refers to the target audiences, or stakeholders, Castells believes that 'public' is the subject of public diplomacy, but civil society is part of that public, and so are non-state actors.

The authors of this article believe that public diplomacy can have various objectives from advocacy to promotion of universal values. Furthermore, non-state actors that have these objectives, in addition to state agencies, are indeed doing public diplomacy intentionally and directly as La Porte has argued. Their public diplomacy agenda reflects aggregate interests of some part of the society since it is not in the monopoly of state to represent and meet society's interests and demands. However, in the case of some non-state actors, their engagement in public diplomacy is rather unintentional as they contribute to public diplomacy outcomes of others (e.g. their home countries) unintentionally.

Therefore, we argue that setting the boundaries of public diplomacy based on the objectives of the actors is not enough to see the full picture. Unintentional public diplomacy outcomes of some non-state actors offer untapped potential for more effective public diplomacy. Their contributions can be understood only when public diplomacy outcomes of their activities -for whatever initial objective they have in mind- are taken into account. This article aims to demonstrate non-state actors' potential for public diplomacy incorporating non-state actors that contribute to public diplomacy outcomes as public diplomacy actors in their own right, and also as partners (collaboration or contractor) of state and as unintentional contributors.

Based on these discussions, this article suggests an objective-based working definition of public diplomacy as follows:

> public diplomacy is a tool used by state and non-state actors for objectives such as advocacy, influence, agenda-setting and mobilization; reinforcing other foreign policy objectives; promotion and prestige; correcting misperceptions; dialogue and mutual understanding; and harmony based on universal values.

Some non-state actors' objectives or outcomes of their activities may coincide with some of the public diplomacy objectives stated here although they do not have public diplomacy agendas. In other words, their objectives or outcomes of their activities match with public diplomacy objectives unintentionally, yet they can offer potential for public diplomacy ends. Their contribution to public diplomacy can be understood from an outcome-based approach to public diplomacy in which outcomes of activities of an entity overlap with public diplomacy objectives stated above.

Below a new Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy Framework (Ayhan, forthcoming) will be introduced to analyze why collaborative public diplomacy is needed and how collaboration between state agencies and non-state actors (or should) take place. To answer the question of why collaborative public diplomacy is needed, activities of non-state actors will be analyzed from (1) relational approaches based mainly on public relations and dialogue theories; (2) social network approaches based mainly on social

networks theories because of complex network environment where public diplomacy take place; (3) collaborative approaches based mainly on nonprofit (or NGO) studies. Furthermore, on the question of how collaboration can (or should) take place, particularly studies on nonprofit-government relations will guide the introduction of a typology of collaboration between state agencies and non-state actors.

2.1 Relational Public Diplomacy and Non-state Actors

Leonard et al. (2002: 10-11) conceptualized public diplomacy with three time frames and three dimension of public diplomacy that suit the time frame: reactive (news management) – hours and days; proactive (strategic communication) -weeks and months-; and lastly relationship-building –years–. Leonard et al. (2002: 11) argue that long-term public diplomacy must involve relationship-building with key individuals, which requires "earning high levels of trust, creating a neutral and safe environment, and can often best be done at one remove from government." Building a framework based on this conceptualization, Gilboa (2008: 73) also implied that long-term public diplomacy should be remotely linked to a government. The underlying premise is that "governments are often mistrusted" (Nye, 2004: 113; 2008: 105) and there could well be "public skepticism" (Leonard et al., 2002: 54) against their activities. Furthermore, opportunity costs to build and maintain relationships is very high (Brown, 2010: 7) since social relations are not mechanic and requires continuous attention for maintenance (Brown, 2013: 246).

Non-state actors' activities are rather freer from this skepticism as they enjoy more neutrality and credibility in the field. They are more neutral and more inclined towards universal values because they are not necessarily seen as self-interested. Furthermore their credibility comes from their expertise and know-how on the ground with adequate local knowledge. They have more visibility in the field "grounded in actions and events" which lead to more healthy interpersonal behavioral relationships as opposed to mediated symbolic relationships (Grunig, 1993: 136). Neutrality (universality), expertise and behavioral relationships are in line with Gass and Seiter's (2009: 158-160) primary dimensions of credibility that are expertise, trustworthiness and goodwill. In addition, non-state actors are more committed for long-term efforts on the ground. They naturally maintain their relationships for their main purposes.

In relational public diplomacy, publics should be regarded as stakeholders and active participants rather than mere target audiences. Interpersonal relationship-building works best if these initiatives are planned and implemented in the long-term sustainably (Leonard et al., 2002: 11; Nye, 2004: 109-110. 2008: 103; Zaharna, 2009: 91-92). Furthermore, if required attention is not given to relationship building, public diplomacy efforts would lack "long-term vision" (Wilson, 1996: 78). Non-state actors can add long-term vision to public diplomacy activities with all their advantages.

Based on seminal public relations works of Ledingham (2003) and Grunig and Hunt (1984), Fitzpatrick (2007: 205-208) argued that new public diplomacy's major purpose is "relationship management" and relationships with public must be "built on trust and accommodation created through genuine dialogue produced by two-way symmetrical communication that is designed to accommodate dual interests." That suggests a normative way of relationship-building dimension of public diplomacy rather than short-to-medium-term focused public diplomacy practices of states in reality (Fitzpatrick, 2007: 201-202). This article also borrows this normative approach to relationship-building which non-state

actors add value to.

Ledingham's (2003: 190) theory of relationship management emphasizes common interests, shared goals, mutual understanding and mutual benefit in the long-term for effective organizational-public relationships. In a similar vein, Nye (2004: 111. 2008: 104) calls for two-way exchanges for effective public diplomacy. However, Grunig and Hunt (1984) argue that for communication to be most effective, it should not only be two-way but it should also be symmetrical. The two-way symmetrical model not only listens to the public but also take the public interests into account when engaging with them. It emphasizes fostering mutual understanding and attainment of benefits also for publics as well as for the organization (Grunig & Hunt, 1984). These public relations approaches are valuable for long-term public diplomacy, because sustainable public diplomacy outcomes are possible when public diplomacy's central purpose is "not to convince but to communicate, not to declare but to listen" and "sharing meaning and understanding" (Castells, 2008: 91).

In line with these relational theories, Allport's "contact hypothesis" (quoted in Cowan & Arsenault, 2008: 20) has similar conditions for effective "contact," but an additional one which is that "participants have equal status or ability to participate." Especially NGO's equal footing with the publics in the field, in addition to their other advantages, is very vital for long-term vision of public diplomacy especially for interpersonal relationship-building.

All of the conditions mentioned here for long-term relationship building show the soft spots of states in public diplomacy. It is difficult for states to build and maintain sustainable relationships with influential individuals and civil society organizations in the long run. Furthermore, it is even more difficult to build and maintain quality two-way symmetrical relationships. However, state agencies can complement its public diplomacy activities and long-term vision by collaborating with some specific non-state actors that have relevant advantages.

2.2 Networked Public Diplomacy and Non-state Actors

We live in a globalized world with various intertwined networks. Public diplomacy is practiced in such a complex network environment in which states are still the most powerful, but not the only actors that make a difference. Within such a network environment, state is one of the stakeholders, but not necessarily the focal organization particularly in the case of long-term public diplomacy (Rowley, 1997: 892).

In the network environment, there are domestic and foreign non-state actors (including diaspora communities both at home and abroad) whose activities are in the realm of public diplomacy either for similar or different objectives. These non-state actors can be regarded as potential partners if there are mutual interests while it is also very likely for them to be competitors or adversaries. Not only institutionalized non-state actors, but also domestic and foreign publics can no longer be seen as mere passive audiences, but they are stakeholders whose satisfaction, collaboration or resistance and pressure can be vital for public diplomacy initiatives' survival (Oliver, 199: 146-148; Rowley, 1997: 895-896). Treating domestic publics as stakeholders and encouraging them to participate and collaborate as partners is significant for public diplomacy projects in a network environment (Attias, 2012; Bátora & Van de Craen, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 433-437; Huijgh, 2011: 64).

If not actively engaged, some of these domestic or diaspora stakeholders – who have enormous potential to be partners – can turn out to be adversaries. They can actively oppose and lobby against their home country's governments' policies abroad (Potter, 2008: 58)

similar to the "boomerang pattern" of Keck and Sikkink (1998: 12-13). That is because, as the term stakeholder suggests they have a stake in public diplomacy activities or outcomes of these activities. They can legitimately advocate interests or values of their constituencies and want their voices to be heard and interests to be reflected in public diplomacy policies. On the state's part, it is difficult to satisfy every stakeholder. However, welcoming stakeholder input and looking for collaboration opportunities would mitigate the risks of alienation of its stakeholders.

Two properties of networks are significant for state's collaboration with its stakeholders in a network environment: network density and centrality of actors in a network. Network density refers to the ratio of the actual ties in a network to the potential ties (Rowley, 1997: 896). In dense networks, communication between tied nodes become more efficient and they create shared behavioral expectations (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989: 456; Rowley, 1997: 897). Furthermore, based on institutional and resource dependence theories, Oliver (1991: 171) concluded that interconnectedness in a network "facilitates the voluntary diffusion of norms, values, and shared information." Due to shared behavioral expectations and norms and joint sanction frameworks, there is greater credibility and lower enforcement costs in dense networks (Burt, 2000: 347; Coleman, 1988: 107-108; Fisher, 2013a: 200; Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997: 111). This is what leading social network theorists referred to as "social capital" which increases the likelihood of collaboration in dense networks (Coleman, 1988: 105; Putnam, 1995: 67; Walker et al., 1997: 111).

In the realm of public diplomacy, state agencies may lack credibility in certain networks or certain parts of a network as discussed above. There can be domestic or local non-state actors – who are at the same time stakeholders – that might enjoy more credibility and have social capital in the (parts of the) networks where state lacks credibility for different reasons. When 'credibility' is the greatest obstacle to reach out to the certain publics, collaboration with actors that have high density in the relevant (part of the) network can facilitate communication and relationship management (Scholz et al., 2008: 393). Collaborating with or outsourcing to more credible non-state actors would bring more effective results for public diplomacy objectives.

Furthermore, public diplomacy seen as self-interests of a state can limit its credibility and capabilities because of negative connotations of propaganda. One way to tackle this problem is to expand public diplomacy objectives to those that are beyond national interests showing goodwill and adherence to universal values. Among other things, public diplomacy objectives can include "global public goods"[2] such as protecting environment, peacebuilding, fostering harmony and mutual understanding for confidence building and security order. What one actor deems valuable can also be valuable for other actors (or stakeholders) especially if those objectives are regarded as universal values and beyond national self-interest (Henrikson, 2005: 68). Emphasizing what public diplomacy can achieve beyond national interests and collaborating with stakeholders to achieve them together can indeed reinforce other public diplomacy objectives in the long-run. It is non-state actors who are not trapped in the boundaries of national interests and enjoy more credibility for such activities as proved in their active advocacy in every area of global public goods from banning landmines to fighting environmental degradation. They represent interests of "global civil

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[2] For a more detailed discussion of global public goods, see (Kaul, 2001, 2012; Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003; Sandler, 2004).

society" providing externalities beyond national boundaries (Castells, 2008; Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 32-33). Producing global public goods adds credibility to other public diplomacy initiatives as it shows goodwill.

Another aspect of networks important for public diplomacy is centrality. Freeman distinguishes three types of centrality as "degree," "closeness," and "betweenness" that refer to communication activity being chosen by others for information flow, independent and efficient access to others and potential control over communication in a network, respectively (Freeman, 1979).

In the realm of public diplomacy, state's reach is limited in some networks or some parts of a network. In other words some key parts of the network may be "dark" to the state (Brown, 2010: 7). This limitation is indeed inevitable since the state's human and financial resources, technical capabilities and issue-specific knowledge are also limited. In those (or parts of) networks, non-state actors may be more centrally located with more extending relationships than the state. Non-state actors could be better connected to the public and/or centrally located to reach influential elites in certain publics. In other words, non-state actors may enter some marketplaces into which state have difficulty entering. Krenig at al. suggest that "if states are to shape the preferences of an international audience, or target, then they must be able to interact with that target in something that functions like a marketplace of ideas" (2010: 414). When 'reach' is the greatest obstacle to conduct effective public diplomacy in some areas, those actors with high centrality can facilitate connection, communication and relationship management (Scholz et al., 2008: 393). Collaborating with or outsourcing to more connected non-state actors would bring more effective results for public diplomacy objectives.

Actors with high centrality are regarded as gatekeepers (or brokers) as they facilitate information exchanges among other actors (Freeman, 1980: 586). Some of these non-state actors may act as brokers or as "network bridges" (Zaharna, 2013, pp. 183-184) connecting state agencies with other parts of the network state agencies have difficulty to reach. Non-state actors have this multiplier potential to span some "structural holes" (Burt, 2000) (dark areas in a network) or in some cases "cultural holes" (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010) (dark areas in understanding of cultural and social practices or discourses in some networks). Scholz et al.'s empirical study (2008: 307, 405) finds that centrality is especially vital for "unstructured policymaking arenas" – such as rather unstructured public diplomacy policymaking – and centrally situated actors would create advantageous opportunities when mutual benefits of collaboration opportunities are not very apparent. However, one must be aware that position in a network or structural holes can depend on the issue in hand since networks are not static. Therefore, network initiatives would prove most successful when they serve specific and limited purposes (Zaharna, 2013: 187-188).

Even though state agencies have enough connections (reach) and credibility (and social capital) for certain network initiatives, there is much to do for state agencies (responsible for public diplomacy) with their limited human, financial and social capital. In order to make up for its insufficiencies, state needs to collaborate with or outsource to the non-state actors that is already doing – or that has potential to do – effective activities in line with public diplomacy objectives of the state. Non-state actors' specialization (know-how) in certain issues and expertise can save state agencies' resources as they do not need to develop the same expertise and know-how in-house (Smith & Grønbjerg, 2006: 227). This would help share the costs (including the opportunity costs of maintaining relationships) with non-state actors.

In other words, public diplomats can use multipliers effectively as "network weavers" who "actively create new interactions between" different groups (Krebs & Holley, 2002: 6). By acting as managers of institutional relationships (Fitzpatrick, 2007), they can increasingly rely more "on non-governmental initiatives, collaborate with non-official agents and benefit from local expertise" (Melissen, 2005a: 22). This bridging role is itself a public good; in Lord's words (2010: 8), "introducing the right partners to each other is an under-supplied public good". Indeed, "the primary role of the public servant is to help citizens articulate and meet their shared interests rather than to attempt to control or steer society" (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000: 549) and it is true for public diplomats too.

Furthermore, non-state actors are not elected by the large public whom they are accountable to in the short-term. Therefore, they can focus on long-term policies and activities with more flexibility, quick response and less bureaucracy in the process as opposed to the state which is often trapped in short-term policymaking with much red-tape (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002: 6; Kelley, 200: 77; Sen & Davala, 2002: 39-40; Smith & Grønbjerg, 2006: 224).

2.3 Collaborative Public Diplomacy and Non-state Actors

In the first two sections of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy Framework, we have discussed the necessity of collaboration with non-state actors for public diplomacy initiatives in a complex network environment that requires careful relational approach in the long-run, i.e. from relational and networked approaches. The above discussions help justification of why collaborative public diplomacy is needed. In this section, we will continue looking at why this collaboration take place based mainly on the literature on government-nonprofit relations and corporate social responsibility. At the end of this section, the discussion on why collaborative public diplomacy is needed is summarized in Table 1.

There are different approaches to *why* state and nonprofits (significant segment of non-state actors mentioned in this article) collaborate. They all have their merits and flaws. Here we will discuss the models that are relevant to collaborative public diplomacy approach.

Market niche model sees nonprofits' engagement in service and goods provision as plugging the gaps created by state and market failures since they meet the demands enhancing people's choices by adding greater diversity and efficiency (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002: 5; Smith & Grønbjerg, 2006: 224). According to this argument, there is a division of labor among three sectors, namely the state, the market and nonprofit sector each meeting the demand from a comparative advantage perspective (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 21; Smith & Grønbjerg, 2006: 224).

This economic model is especially relevant for public diplomacy when public diplomacy outcomes are regarded as public good for the society (Leonard et al., 2002: 9). There is certain limitation to state's capacity to maximize potential public diplomacy outcomes, particularly in the long-run. Even though public goods are often discussed with a concentration on service delivery, there is near-consensus that public goods can also include "democratic values, representation, citizenship, social capital, a sense of belonging (solidarity), community values and social integration" (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002: 15). Considering the "collective benefits" (Fisher & Lucas, 2011: 2) of potential public diplomacy outcomes, there is no reason to exclude it from this broader definition of public goods. Like most other public goods, non-state actors can provide this public good either by itself or in collaboration with the state. In other words, non-state actors can "supplement"

(Young, 2006 : 39-40) the state in creating public diplomacy outcomes which are regarded as public goods.

Another approach to collaboration is transaction model in which nonprofits have services to offer state which have resources to take advantage of these services (Smith & Grønbjerg, 2006: 225). In addition to government and market failures, one must be aware of "voluntary failure" which refers to nonprofits' weaknesses such as insufficiency (limited scale and resources), amateurism, particularism (not interests of community at large) and paternalism (sponsor's visions and preferences) (Salamon, 1987). Because of these and other insufficiencies, not all nonprofits are always the best candidates for collaboration. In this model, state looks to exploit advantages of nonprofits – despite its insufficiencies – especially when its direct engagement is seen to be not efficient or where nonprofits' support is crucial as outlined above (Salamon, Sokolowski, & Anheier, 2000: 12). Resource dependence theory also complements transaction model as the transaction between state and nonprofits occur depending on "1) the importance of the resource, 2) the availability of alternatives and 3) the ability to compel provision of resource" (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Saidel, 1991: 545).

In the realm of public diplomacy, transaction model and resource dependence (or interdependence) theory are more relevant for outsourcing relations between government and nonprofits. State can look out for contractors with specialized expertise and know-how in a certain field. In this model, non-state actors are "complementary" (Young, 2006: 39-40) partners to state helping to implement public diplomacy initiatives, and mainly financed by the state.

Collaboration with non-state actors is not without flaws. Management of collaboration can also be costly for state agencies. One way to reduce these costs of collaboration with non-state actors is inviting enthusiasts to contribute to public diplomacy initiatives freely and without much burden to the state in an "open-source" (Fisher, 2008) fashion.[3]

Furthermore, like any other outsourcing relation, public diplomacy outsourcing too can create principal-agent problem (Pratt, Zeckhauser, & Arrow, 1985) in which it is difficult for the state to make sure nonprofits – given their insufficiencies – conduct effective public diplomacy on its behalf. Furthermore, voluntary failures, which are mentioned above, can create problems for public diplomacy initiatives. For example, funds received from state for a program to promote a country's image can be used for asymmetrical and aggressive self-interested activities which may put the initiative in jeopardy. Therefore, collaboration with or outsourcing to non-state actors whose interests, goals and activities can be seen as suspicious and counterproductive should be avoided (Ayhan, 2014: 134). However, principal-agent problem or voluntary failures should not discourage collaboration with non-state actors altogether since they have much potential to be utilized for public diplomacy initiatives.

Nevertheless, state agencies may have a limited vision of public diplomacy outcomes undermining the potential achievements that can be realized in collaboration with non-state actors. An essential first step is creating awareness for state agencies about potential public diplomacy outcomes when public diplomacy policies are made taking into account relational, networked and collaborative perspectives. On the civil society's part, recognizing public diplomacy outcomes as public good will lead to more active engagement and more expectations from the state in this area reflecting aggregation of interests of the society for

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[3] For examples of such collaborative public diplomacy initiatives, see (Attias, 2012; Ayhan, upcoming; Bátora & Van de Craen, 2006; Henrikson, 2005; Hocking, 2008, p. 70; Mueller, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 4).

Table 1. Non-State actors in relational, networked and collaborative public diplomacy (adapted from (Ayhan, forthcoming))

	Issue	**Collaborative approaches**		
		State's weaknesses	**Non-state actors' advantages**	**Related non-state actors**
Relational approaches	Relationship-building	Lack of long-term vision Public skepticism Maintenance costs Symbolic relationships	Long-term vision Neutrality Credibility Behavioral relationships	On-the-ground Local knowledge Long-term-focused
	Mutuality & symmetrical	Asymmetrical Self-interests	Symmetrical Mutual interests	Collaborating with stakeholders Mutual interests Action-oriented
Networked approaches	Credibility	Public skepticism Self-interests Limited social capital	Neutrality/ universality Credibility Social capital	High density (high social capital) Credible (trusted)
	Reach	Limited reach Limited resources/ knowledge	Bridging Spanning structural (or cultural) holes	High centrality
	Resources	Limited resources Bureaucracy	Expertise Know-how Flexibility	Specialization (know-how)

public goods (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002: 14; Castells, 2008: 91).

Lastly, collaboration can also take place without formal contracts. Because of the slowness of the bureaucracy as an organization required for formal collaboration, informal collaboration can take place quite often either to speed up formal collaboration (Chisholm, 1992) or even as an alternative itself (Gazley, 2008). Formality may even discourage some non-state actors who do not want to put efforts into endless bureaucratic procedures. Informality, as much as it is permitted by the law or practice, can complement formal collaboration. Furthermore, informal collaboration or informal relationships, in addition to formal ones, helps make better use of advantages of non-state actors such as flexibility and efficacy. Informal networks can also span public and private spheres (Evans, 1997: 7) in which public diplomats can act as "boundary-spanners" (Hocking, 2004: 151).

3. TYPOLOGY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

We will now lay out our typology for *how* collaboration between state and non-state actors for public diplomacy initiatives take place. This typology is outlined in Table 2.

Brinkerhoff (2002) constructed a typology of partnership based on two dimensions: mutuality and identity. Mutuality refers to interdependence in partnership while identity refers to maintenance of (especially the weaker organization's) core values, constituencies and sectoral characteristics (e.g. comparative advantages of being a nonprofit organization) (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 22-24). Mutuality is important especially for enduring long-term collaboration, as opposed to ad hoc partnerships. Mutuality leads to a sense of ownership (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 27; Fisher, 2008: 14; 2013a: 200; 2013b: 219) of the collaborative project which increases mutual trust (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 27; Burt, 2005: 112-131; Trent, 2012: 41); strengthen partnership norms (Fisher, 2013b: 219); and in turn reduces partnership construction and maintenance costs (Brown, 2010: 7; Scholz et al., 2008: 396). The idea of mutuality is in line with relational approaches.

Organizational identity is significant for partnerships, because partners agree to collaborate for the present qualities and characteristics they bring with them. In other words, maintenance of identity is the basis of collaboration's "value-added" (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 22). Failure to maintain organization's core values, constituencies and sectoral characteristics such as comparative advantages of being a nonprofit organization would destroy the advantages of the partnership, and in turn decreasing the value-added of future partnerships with the same or different partners (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 27). Mutuality and maintenance of identity would lead especially the weaker organization to engage in collaboration with more enthusiasm as opposed to "external motivating factors, such as rewards, punishments, or social pressure" (Fisher, 2013b: 218). Like mutuality, maintaining identity is also in line with relational approaches.

In order to pursue mutuality and maintain identity in a partnership for more effective collaboration, beginning with shared interests and goals is an important step. Relationship management theory (Ledingham, 2003: 190) and excellence theory (i.e. two-way symmetrical communication) (Grunig & Hunt, 1984) both emphasize solving common problems by focusing on shared interests and goals. Commonalities in collaborative initiative can also be based on network narratives that Zaharna (2013: 186) puts forward: task-based narratives that partners focus on the shared objective; social-based narratives that highlight belonging in the partnership and associating with the partners; and identity-based narratives that emphasize "a sense of being (rather than belonging or doing)."

Collaboration is still possible where state and non-state actors share similar objectives, but have different means "complementing" (Najam, 2000) each other; and also where state and non-state actors' means are similar but towards different objectives "co-opting" (Najam, 2000) each other. Collaboration with non-state actors who have public diplomacy objectives, but rather do it on its own terms – rather than being a contractor to the state – falls into 'complementarity' category. Collaboration with non-state actors who do not have public diplomacy objectives, but have potential to contribute to public diplomacy outcomes fall into this 'co-optation' category.

In the realm of public diplomacy, Zaharna (2012) offers a rare typology for public diplomacy initiatives. In her typology, there are four quadrants based on two dimensions: the initiator of the project, and whose needs are prioritized. The first quadrant is state-initiated project for state-driven needs and goals; the second quadrant is state-initiated project in partnership with the public aligned to public needs and goals; the third quadrant is public-initiated project in partnership with the state aligned to state needs and goals; and the fourth quadrant is public-initiated project for public-driven needs and goals independent from the state (Zaharna, 2012). She argues that there has been a shift from state-based initiatives to

Table 2. Typology of collaboration between state and non-state actors (adapted from (Ayhan, forthcoming))

		Proposal for collaboration by	
		State	**Non-state actors**
Main objectives of	**State**	Active contractor (outsourcer)	Passive contractor (outsourcer)
	Non-state actors	Active Collaboration	Passive Collaboration

public-based ones treating publics as active "stakeholders" who share similar goals and perspectives with the state. However, Zaharna (2012: 2) asserts that there is also the need to shift from state-centric initiatives to public-centric ones which are more participatory and relation-focused. Failure to engage stakeholders in this quadrant may be costly if they become adversarial (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 434; Zaharna, 2012: 3).

Collaboration typologies discussed above help us understand different kinds of partnerships that take place between state and non-state actors. Zaharna's typology guides us to categorize public diplomacy initiatives to carefully analyze stakeholders' place in these initiatives. Especially, Brinkerhoff's typology can be adopted itself to categorize collaborative public diplomacy initiatives. However, there is necessity to distinguish who proposes the collaboration in the first place. That is because often collaboration is understood and practiced from a state-centric approach in which state evaluates applications from non-state actors rather than the other way around. We attempt to build our typology for collaborative public diplomacy initiatives. This typology questions such state-centric approach.

Our typology, which is laid out in Table 2, is based on two dimensions: whose objectives are prioritized in the collaboration and who proposes collaboration. If the state's objectives are prioritized, then non-state actors act as contractors (outsourcers) for the state's public diplomacy initiatives. In the case that, state agencies have created a guideline for a specific project and ask non-state actors to apply for the project, then the type of collaboration is 'passive contractor' one since state agencies look forward to applications from non-state actors and does not itself search for eligible partners. For example, a state agency has a program sending a corps of volunteers overseas and accepts applications from NGOs for performing the related tasks as outlined by state agency's guidelines.

Furthermore, if there is a state initiative which requires non-state actors' participation, state agencies can alternatively seek for non-state actors who are already doing similar activities for similar objectives and can potentially bring the best results. This is regarded as 'active contractor' in this typology since the state agencies actively seek for partners. For example, for the same volunteer corps program, the state agency may ask a certain NGO – who has proven to be experienced and effective in this area – to perform the related tasks as outlined by state agency's guidelines without requiring it or other NGOs to go through the open application process.

If non-state actors' objectives are prioritized, then it is referred to as collaboration in the typology. When state agencies open the channels for non-state actors to approach it for collaboration for their own initiatives, it is called 'passive collaboration.' For example, a non-state actor has a program to promote its home country's culture overseas and proposes it to related state agency and that state agency decides to collaborate with the non-state actor by supporting it financially, logistically or by adding value to the project through other means.

On the other hand, state agencies can also seek for non-state actors whose activities and interests are in line with state's public diplomacy objectives and propose them collaboration in their terms. In other words, non-state actors will keep doing what they do with the state agency's support. This kind of collaboration is called 'active collaboration' since state agencies actively look for partners. For example, a non-state actor does the above-mentioned program to promote its home country's culture on its own. The state agency does not wait for this non-state actor's application for collaboration, but instead proposes collaboration first to support the project financially, logistically or by adding value to the project by other means. Then it would be up to the non-state actor whether to accept collaboration or not weighing its advantages and disadvantages. Non-state actors may also decide not to collaborate with the state because of its downward accountability, i.e. accountability towards its constituents, and independence concerns (Atack, 1999: 859; Ebrahim, 2003: 822; Kilby, 2006: 952-955).

Opening the channels for passive collaboration and passive contractor increases the potential of public diplomacy initiatives. Seeking for contractors actively adds more (and probably better) alternatives to the ones that approach the state agencies first. Furthermore, active collaboration is very significant for collaborative public diplomacy initiatives since some non-state actors refrain from taking the first step to approach state agencies because of independence and downward accountability concerns. Actively seeking for partners is also discussed in Nijhof et al.'s "Partnerships for Corporate Social Responsibility" article (2008). In their business-case (outside-in) orientation, companies first propose dialogue and partnership with NGOs in order to gain sympathy among stakeholders and control any unpredictable adverse impacts (Nijhof et al., 2008).

For non-state actors, keeping their main objectives during collaboration with the state means maintaining their identity, as in Brinkerhoff's typology, that they maintain core values, constituencies and comparative advantages of being a nonprofit organization (2002: 22-24). In Zaharna's typology, it is akin to public (or non-state actor)-centric initiatives. Brinkerhoff's mutuality dimension is not reflected in this typology, however it is significant for relational aspect of collaborative public diplomacy initiatives especially in the long-run. Furthermore, 'active collaboration' especially in the fourth quadrant of Zaharna's typology is required to utilize potential comparative advantage of the non-state actors' own initiatives and to avoid possible opportunity costs in the case that these potential partner non-state actors turn to adversaries as discussed before.

Empirically, it is suggested that, proposal for collaboration often comes from nonprofit sector (passive), as opposed to coming from state agencies (active) (Sen & Davala, 2002: 39). Because state is more powerful and controls more resources which non-state actors lack and need, it is usually non-state actors who need to convince the state agencies for collaboration (Sen & Davala, 2002: 39). However, effective public diplomacy in a swiftly changing complex network environment requires state agencies to actively seek for partners who would add value to public diplomacy initiatives. Therefore, we argue that collaborative approaches to public diplomacy in themselves are not enough. Both from a pragmatic and normative perspective, state agencies should look for partners actively as well as opening the channels for passive partnerships (contractor and collaboration).

Active partnerships (active collaboration and active contractors) can also be part of the solution to the principal-agent problem mentioned above. By collaborating with non-state actors who would continue to do what they do effectively in the field, state agencies would not need to worry so much about whether its interests are in jeopardy in this type of collaboration. This is because state agencies would know what non-state actors do and

approach it for collaboration to ask them keep doing what they are already doing. However, there is no guarantee that all non-state actors would welcome collaboration with state. Some non-state can avoid approaching state agencies first because of maintaining identity concerns; while some others could even close its doors even if the proposal for collaboration comes from state agencies because of their strict downward accountability and independence principles.

4. CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed non-state actors' relevance to public diplomacy activities. The article brought together relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy borrowing theories from various academic fields. This study has primarily concentrated on the theoretical discussion and is yet to enrich the discussion by providing empirical support which since it was beyond the scope of this article. The next step for the authors is to complement the theory with empirical research. At the moment, the empirical exploration of NGOs' contributions to public diplomacy is well underway as one of the authors (Ayhan, forthcoming) has taken up this task.

The theoretical discussions in this article can be used for analyzing all types of non-state actors' activities' implications for public diplomacy outcomes: NGOs, corporations, inter-governmental organizations and others. Each category of non-state actors has different capacities, different advantages and unrealized potential that have implications for the public diplomacy realm. This article's main focus was NGOs as non-state actors. Therefore future empirical studies on specific NGOs' contributions to specific countries' public diplomacy outcomes and how they collaborate or fail to collaborate with state agencies for public diplomacy would complement this theoretical discussion. However, the discussions in this article can also support studies of other non-state actors' role in public diplomacy.

The public diplomacy concept has witnessed an evolution parallel to globalization, consolidation of democracies and technological advancements (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 435). The concept of public diplomacy was coined to give name to new diplomatic practices that target publics in an era where public opinion matters. In the early 21st Century, the concept evolved into 'new public diplomacy' which recognized more dimensions and new actors. Analytical approaches to new public diplomacy required borrowing theories from various academic fields. Relational, networked and collaborative approaches to public diplomacy came out as an outcome of these multidisciplinary studies.

In this article, non-state actors are regarded as actors of public diplomacy in their own right. Representing some aggregate interests of the society, non-state actors may have their own public diplomacy agenda. Meanwhile, some other non-state actors may have other objectives but contributing to some public diplomacy objectives of state (or other non-state actors such as intergovernmental organizations) unintentionally.

It is suggested in this article that non-state actors have certain advantages to complement or supplement state's public diplomacy efforts especially in the long-run. Long-term public diplomacy efforts require relationship-building with related stakeholders who cannot be treated merely as passive target audiences. Successful relationship management necessitates a focus on common interests, shared goals, mutual understanding and mutual benefit. Public relations theories suggest that two-way communication is significant for sustainability of relationship management. Furthermore, stakeholder's interests should be taken into account

when crafting public diplomacy policies for symmetrical communication. Relationship-building is a long-term effort and non-state actors have proven more successful in building and maintaining relationships due to their advantages such as their credibility based on neutrality (universality), expertise and behavioral relationships; not being trapped in short-term span of political policymaking and being on equal footing with their stakeholders.

Public diplomacy is practiced in a complex network environment in which state is not necessarily the focal actor. Two properties of networks, density and centrality of an actor, are particularly relevant to public diplomacy initiatives. High density creates social capital for densely connected actors and this provides the network with high credibility and trust. High centrality of an actor, on the other hand, widens its reach in the network. Different kinds of network properties may be needed for different networked public diplomacy initiatives. Collaboration with a non-state actor that has great social capital in a dense network would be very rewarding when state suffers from credibility; while a non-state actor with high centrality would be a great partner when state agencies have difficulty to reach certain (parts of) networks.

Non-state actors' potential for public diplomacy can be tapped by states only if state agencies open their channels for collaboration opportunities (passive partnerships) and/or they approach non-state actors for collaboration (active partnerships). Otherwise, state-centric public diplomacy will be insufficient, because state has limited financial, human and social capital; it lacks credibility and reach in a network; and it is difficult for state agencies to craft long-term public diplomacy vision especially in terms of costly relationship management. Furthermore, state agencies' willingness for collaboration does not automatically convince non-state actors to take part in collaborative public diplomacy initiatives. They may choose not to because of their strict downward accountability and independence concerns.

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